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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Jimenez's Motion For DNA Testing by
Concluding That it Could Only Authorize Funding For DNA Testing if He Met I.C.
§ 19-4902's Specific DNA Testing Requirements, Even Where the Test Was
Requested to Support a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel That Was
Presented in a Petition Timely Filed Under Section 19-4902(a)
Mr. Jimenez informed his trial attorney that the blood on his shoes was from an unrelated

fight with an individual named Xavier and did not come from Mr. Voshall. R. Vol. 1, p. 13-14~
53. Trial counsel nevertheless did not contact Xavier or consider DNA testing or other testing
such as blood group or type. R. Vol. 3, p. 362, ,r 9(b)(viii); p. 366, if9; p. 366, ifl 0. With no
direct evidence that Mr. Jimenez stabbed Mr. Voshall, the State introduced the shoes into
evidence and urged the jury to find Mr. Jimenez guilty in light of other evidence combined,
including the "blood on Juan's shoes; not the bottom of the shoes, the tops of his shoes." R. Vol.
2 p. 283 (p. 10, In. 4 - p. 12, In. 18-25); see also p. 284 (p. 14, In. 25 - p. 15, In. 10-24); p. 285 (p.
17, In. 17-25); p. 289 (p. 34, In. 6-10); p. 290 (p. 40, In. 10-13).
In his post-conviction relief petition, Mr. Jimenez alleged that counsel was ineffective for
refusing to interview Xavier or request further testing of the blood on the shoes. R. Vol. 3, p.
362, ,r 9(b)(viii); p. 366, if9; p. 366, ,r10. To support this claim, Mr. Jimenez filed a motion
seeking DNA testing of the blood found on his shoes and Mr. Voshall's shirt. Id. at p. 384-88.
The district court erroneously denied the request because Mr. Jimenez did not meet I. C. § 194902 's requirements. Id. at p. 14, In. 14-25.
As explained in Mr. Jimenez's Opening Brief, LC. § 19-4902's specific requirements for
DNA testing provide an exception to the statute of limitations when new scientific evidence
could establish a defendant's innocence and in no way precludes the court from ordering testing

at county expense for an indigent petitioner in order to obtain evidence to support a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, set forth in a timely filed post-conviction relief. Because the
district court did not apply the applicable legal standards in denying Mr. Jimenez's request for
DNA testing, it abused its discretion in denying his motion to have the blood on his shoes tested
against the blood on Mr. Voshall's shirt. Moreover, the DNA testing was necessary to protect
Mr. Jimenez's substantial rights and, therefore, Mr. Jimenez was harmed by the district court's
erroneous conclusion that he was required to meet J.C.§ 19-4902's requirements before funding
for that testing could be authorized.
In response, the State claims that whether the district court erred in refusing to authorize
the DNA testing is moot because such testing was in fact accomplished in a federal criminal case.
Respondent's Brief, p. 7-8. Thus, according to the State, Mr. Jimenez "already obtained the only
relief to which he was theoretically entitled pursuant to that motion. Id. at p. 8.
However, not only was Mr. Jimenez entitled to obtain the testing requested in the motion,
he was entitled to have the district court consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
light of those testing results. Because the subsequent testing was accomplished after the district
court dismissed the post-conviction action, those results were not available to support Mr.
Jimenez's post-conviction relief claims. Thus, Mr. Jimenez continues to suffer harm from the
district court's error and the case should be remanded for consideration of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in light of the DNA testing.
An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is
capable of being concluded by judicial relief. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8,232 P.3d 327, 329
(2010); Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372,377 (2008). Even where a
2

question is moot, the Court will consider the issue: (1) when there is the possibility of collateral
legal consequences imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is
likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot
issue raises concerns of substantial public interest. Id.
Here, the district court's error deprived Mr. Jimenez of the opportunity to have the DNA
evidence considered in his initial post-conviction action and it is questionable whether Mr.
Jimenez is entitled to present the DNA results in a second post-conviction action absent a remand
from this Court. A ground for post-conviction relief may be raised in a successive petition if the
court finds "sufficient reason" explaining why the ground "was not asserted or was inadequately
raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." LC. § 19-4908. Several Idaho
cases have noted that deficient representation by counsel in an initial post-conviction proceeding,
that causes a claim to be inadequately presented to the court, constitutes a "sufficient reason" to
allow assertion of the same claim in a subsequent post-conviction petition pursuant to LC. §
19-4908. Palmer v. Dermitt, l 02 Idaho 591, 595-96, 635 P .2d at 959-60 (1981 ); Schwartz v.

State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400,403 (Ct. App. 2008); Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438,
441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006); Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411,420, 128 P.3d 948,957
(Ct. App. 2005); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798-800, 992 P.2d 789, 793-95 (Ct. App.
1999). However, counsel is unaware of cases discussing other potential reasons that would be
potentially sufficient, including whether the district court's erroneous denial of testing permits
such testing to be considered in a subsequent action.
Whether the district court erred in applying the incorrect legal standard and denying Mr.
Jimenez's request for DNA testing presents a real and substantial controversy that is capable of
3

being concluded by judicial relief - i.e. an order remanding the case to the district court with
instruction to consider Mr. Jimenez's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in light of the
DNA testing establishing that the blood on the shoes did not belong to Mr. Voshall.
Accordingly, the district court's error in refusing DNA testing is not moot and this Court should
consider the claim.
B.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Post-Conviction
Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of Material Fact Entitling Him to an
Evidentiary Hearing
1.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim
That He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Refused
to Request DNA Testing of the Blood Found on Mr. Jimenez's Shoes

Trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to obtain further testing of the blood on Mr.
Jimenez's shoes, even after Mr. Jimenez explained that the blood came from a fight with a
person named Xavier. Further, such testing would have excluded Mr. Voshall as the source of
that blood and, thus, the State would not have been able to rely on the shoes to support Mr.
Jimenez's alleged guilt. Accordingly, there is a reasonable probability that if the testing had been
done, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
The State's argument in response appears to center around the assumption that trial
counsel would have shared incriminating testing results with the prosecution. See Respondent's
Brief p. 15-16. Thus, the State urges that: "it would have at best been a risky proposition for trial
counsel to have sought DNA testing before trial without knowing for certain what the results of
that testing would be." Respondent's Briefp. 16, n. 5. In light of this "risk" combined with what
it characterizes as the DNA testing's "de minimis exculpatory value," the State claims Mr.
Jimenez did not present an issue of fact sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel
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provided effective assistance.
It is unclear from the State's argument why trial counsel would have made the State privy

to his strategy and investigation or disclosed any testing results that were harmful to Mr.
Jimenez. Thus, even if reasonable to assume one's client is being untruthful regarding the facts
of the case in deciding what course of investigation to take, it was not objectively reasonable to
forgo testing critical evidence because the results might not have been favorable. Moreover, the
ability to infer the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes came from the victim provided the State with a
critical piece of evidence and the value of depriving the State of that evidence can not be
described as de minimis. Thus, Mr. Jimenez was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether
trial counsel's decision to forgo DNA testing was objectively reasonable and whether the results
of the trial would have been different had such testing been accomplished.

a.

there is an issue of fact regarding counsel's deficient performance

Counsel was entitled to access to the blood sample to conduct his own analysis and
investigation. See I.C.R.16(b )( 4). Counsel would only have been required to disclose the
specifics and reports of such testing if he intended to introduce them in evidence at the trial or to
present testimony related to those results or reports. I.C.R. 16(c)(2). It should go without saying
that competent trial counsel would not have informed the prosecutor of his precise reasoning for
obtaining a sample of the blood or the precise testing obtained. As described by Justice White:
Law enforcement ... must be dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure
for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of the crime ...
But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth.
Our system assigns him a different mission .... The State has the obligation to
present the evidence. Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he knows
what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help the
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prosecution's case.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-57 (1967)(Justice White joined by Justices Harlan and
Stewart, dissenting in part and concurring in part).

It would have been objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to share his reasons for
requesting a sample of the blood on the shoes with the prosecutor 1 or to share those results with
the prosecution unless favorable. That Mr. Jimenez obtained a sample of the blood to conduct
his own investigation would not necessarily prompt the State to assume DNA testing would be

In State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100, 967 P .2d 702, 714 (1998), the Court indicated that
the public defender statute did not "guarantee" an ex parte application for investigative assistance
and that the prosecutor knowledge's "of the application" did not deny the defendant due process.
The Court thus held that trial counsel "did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by
making the requests for assistance in open court with notice to the prosecutor." Here, trial
counsel was privately retained and, thus, would not have sought funding for the DNA testing in
open court. Whether counsel would have been ineffective in sharing trial strategy with the
prosecution without the necessity of requesting funds is entirely distinct from the circumstance
presented in Wood. In any event, nothing in Wood suggests that an attorney could not request
funding for testing on an ex parte basis when that request would reveal client confidences and
trial strategy. Instead, Wood indicates the statute does not "guarantee" the availability of such a
procedure and counsel was not ineffective in making the prosecutor aware of the "application" in
that case. Wood should not stand for the proposition that the inability to access funding for
necessary experts on an ex parte basis never violates due process, especially in circumstances in
which supporting the request would require counsel to reveal client communications or defense
strategy that would have otherwise remained secret. Principles of fundamental fairness
guaranteed by due process require that the basic tools of an adequate defense be provided to
those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985);
United States v. Chase, 499 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007). Indigent defendants who must seek
state-funding to hire an expert should not be required to reveal their theory of defense when their
more affluent counterparts, with funds to hire experts, are not required to reveal their theory of
defense. Moore v. State, 889 A.2d 325, 341-42 (Md. 2005). Thus, Congress and several states
provide a mechanism whereby a defendant can submit an ex parte request for investigative
services. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e) (requiring ex parte hearing when indigent defendant needs
funds); Moore, 889 A.2d at 341 (listing statutes in Minnesota, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Nevada and New York that require an ex parte hearing when an indigent defendant requests
funds and indicating that courts in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Michigan, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington have held that an ex parte hearing is
required).
1
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completed or to change its own decision to limit its testing to confirming that the blood was
human. Moreover, Mr. Jimenez specifically requested that the shoes be tested because he knew
the blood came from someone other than the victim. Requesting testing of the blood found on
the shoes was only a "risky proposition" if counsel assumed Mr. Jimenez was lying and planned
to share his strategy with the prosecution.
The State also suggests that "avoiding testing of the knife may also have played a role in
counsel's tactical choice to not seek testing of the shoes." Respondent's Brief p. 16, n. 5.
However, Mr. Jimenez's explanation of the blood on the shoes would not have prompted trial
counsel to request DNA testing of the knife. Even if testing the shoes resulted in testing the
knife, it was more critical to exclude the victim as the source of blood on the shoes than on the
knife. As described more fully below and in Mr. Jimenez's Opening Brief, the State used the
blood on the shoes to strenuously argue that Mr. Jimenez stabbed the victim even though the
witnesses were only able to testify to a push. While confirmation that the blood on the knife
belonged to the victim certainly would have tied the knife to the offense, it would not have
furthered the State's theory that it was Mr. Jimenez rather than his friend who stabbed the victim.
Mr. Jimenez presented an issue of fact sufficient to rebut the presumption of trial
counsel's effective assistance. Accordingly, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the
district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
b.

prejudice

The State not only introduced the shoes into evidence, it repeatedly relied on the blood to
support Mr. Jimenez's guilt in closing argument. Accordingly, had DNA testing of those shoes
excluded Mr. Voshall as the source of the blood, the State would have been deprived of a critical
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piece of its circumstantial evidence puzzle and there is a reasonable probability the outcome of
the trial would have been different.
The State responds that since the DNA evidence would not have conclusively excluded
Mr. Jimenez as the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall, such evidence had minimal exculpatory
value. However, that the testing would not have not completely exonerated Mr. Jimenez does
not render the value of the evidence de minimis, particularly in light of the evidence against Mr.
Jimenez and the role the shoes played in the trial.
After admitting it did not have direct evidence that Mr. Jimenez stabbed Mr. Voshall, the
State argued the jury should find Mr. Jimenez guilty based on the other evidence combined. R.
Vol. 2 p. 283 (p. 10, In. 4 - p. 12, In. 18). The State strenuously argued that the blood on Mr.
Jimenez's shoes showed he had stabbed Mr. Voshall, including repeated emphasis on the blood's
position on the shoes and asking the jury to question how else the blood would have gotten there.

Id. 283 (p. 12, 22-25); p. 284 (p. 14, In. 25 - p. 15, In. 10); (p. 15, In. 13-24); p. 285 (p. 17, In. 1725); p. 289 (p. 34, In. 6-10). The State then held the shoes in :front of the jury, indicating "the
very shoes that [the criminologist] tested. When you look at these, look for the stains. You'll
notice they're towards the end of the shoes." Id. at p. 290 (p. 40, In. 10-13).
While the State correctly lists other evidence that supported Mr. Jimenez's guilt - the
push, the hand in the pocket and the knife along the road [Respondent's Brief, p. 18] - none of
that evidence directly linked Mr. Jimenez to the stabbing and destroyed his ability to persuasively
argue that it was his companion who wielded the knife in the same manner as the blood on top of
the shoes. Had trial counsel obtained DNA testing, the State would have been deprived of
critical and persuasive evidence of Mr. Jimenez's guilt. Accordingly, there is a reasonable
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probability that DNA testing would have changed the outcome of the trial and the district court
erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's petition for post-conviction relief.

2.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim
That He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Failed
to Prepare Mr. Jimenez For Cross-Examination and Failed to Provide Him
With an Opportunity to Adequately View the Surveillance Video

Trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to prepare Mr. Jimenez for crossexamination and by failing to ensure that Mr. Jimenez had an adequate opportunity to view the
video surveillance. Mr. Jimenez was prejudiced by that performance because he was unprepared
for the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination and had difficulty answering questions about
the video. The district court therefore erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's postconviction relief petition.
In response, the State contends that Mr. Jimenez "failed to articulate how trial counsel
was supposed to divine the questions the prosecutor ultimately asked or what counsel could have
done to improve Jimenez's memory of the events of the evening in question." Respondent's
Brief, p. 22. However, Mr. Jimenez alleged that trial counsel "never prepared me to testify, we
did not practice any questioning, and he did not tell me what questions to expect on
cross-examination." R. Vol. 3, p. 366

,r 13 (emphasis added).

That no attorney can predict the

precise questions a prosecutor will ask does not mean that counsel should not have discussed the
likely themes and approaches of the prosecutor's cross-examination, recommended methods of
response and otherwise provide Mr. Jimenez with some idea of what to expect. Similarly, by
running through the topics likely to come out during the testimony, Mr. Jimenez would have
necessarily jogged his memory regarding the events and had a better recollection when
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questioned by the prosecutor.
The State also notes that Mr. Jimenez did not specifically allege that he asked his attorney
to reserve a conference room in order to better view the video. As described in Mr. Jimenez's
Opening Brief, such a request can be inferred from the record and, in any event, it is counsel's
responsibility to request adequate facilities to allow clients to review the evidence against them.
Denying access to contact visits so attorneys can review audio and video discovery with criminal
defendants would be a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Jimenez presented sufficient evidence to present an issue of fact as to whether trial
counsel performed deficiently by failing to prepare him for cross-examination and by failing to
ensure that he had an adequate opportunity to view the video surveillance. Mr. Jimenez was
prejudiced by that performance because he was unprepared for the prosecutor's questions on
cross-examination and unable to answer questions about the video, which made him seem
evasive to the jury. The district court therefore erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's
post-conviction relief petition.

3.

Other Reasons the District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr.
Jimenez's Post-Conviction Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of
Material Fact Entitling Him to an Evidentiary Hearing

As to the other basis for reversal set forth in Mr. Jimenez's Opening Brief, he does not
have any additional reply to the arguments presented in the State's Brief.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in his Opening Brief, Mr. Jimenez respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing his post-conviction claims and to
remand this case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

j_!i_ day of September, 2013.
, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Robyn Fyffe
Attorney for Juan Anthony Jimenez
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